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Abstract 
The study explores the relationship between corruption (as measured in a cross-national 
sample survey) and other indicators such as economic growth, democratisation, 
institutionalisation, increasing freedom and the informal economy as important indicators of 
change in post-communist Eastern and Central Europe. It was found that corruption 
perceptions are very highly correlated with economic growth: the higher the level of 
corruption, the lower the level of growth. It was also the case the more free and democratic a 
society was (that is, the more open) the less corruption was perceived. The analysis is based 
upon a representative sample survey carried out in Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, FRY, Romania, Bulgaria, Belarus and Ukraine in 1998 
(N=12643). 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Studie untersucht die Beziehung zwischen Korruption — gemessen als subjektiver 
Indikator in international-vergleichenden Umfragen — und anderen Indikatoren wie 
Wirtschaftswachstum, Demokratisierung, Institutionalisierung, zunehmende persönliche 
Freiheiten und die informelle Ökonomie als wichtige Indikatoren des Wandels im 
postkommunistischen Zentral- und Osteuropa. Die Autoren fanden eine starke negative 
Korrelation zwischen subjektiven Korruptions-Wahrnehmungen einerseits und 
wirtschaftlichem Wachstum andererseits: je höher das wahrgenommene Niveau der 
Korruption, desto niedriger war das Niveau des Wirtschaftswachstums. Es war auch klar 
erkennbar, dass eine Gesellschaft, die offener, freier und demokratischer ist, auch ein 
deutlich geringeres Korruptionsniveau aufwies. Diese Analyse beruht auf einer akademisch-
vergleichenden Umfragestudie mit 12.643 persönlichen Interviews im Jahre 1998 in 
folgenden Ländern: Belarus, Bulgarien, Bundesrepublik Yugoslawien, Kroatien, Polen, 
Rumänien, Tschechien, Slowakei, Slowenien, Ukraine und Ungarn. 
Keywords 
Democratisation, corruption, economic development, transition in Eastern and Central 
Europe, postcommunism 
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Osteuropa, Postkommunismus 
 
  
Contents 
Different roads to reform   3 
How can we measure corruption?   3 
Part 1: An index of corruption   5 
Part 2: Variations between countries   8 
 Hypothesis 1: That corruption declines with economic development   8 
 Hypothesis 2: That corruption declines with democratisation   9 
 Hypothesis 3: That corruption declines with increasing marketisation   11 
 Hypothesis 4: That corruption declines with increasing institutionalisation   12 
 Hypothesis 5: That corruption declines with increasing freedom   14 
Hypothesis 6: That corruption declines with the increasing formalisation of 
economic activities   16 
Part 3: Variations within countries   18 
Part 4: Corrupt behaviour   20 
Conclusions   21 
Reference List   22 
I H S — Wallace, Haerpfer / Democratisation, Economic Development and Corruption — 1 
Corruption is present in all societies to a greater or lesser extent and was recognised as an 
integral part of the former Communist systems. Many people are under the impression, 
however, that corruption has risen in this region since the demise of Communism. Indeed the 
possibilities and scope for corruption — given the mixture of massive privatisation, weak 
states and underdeveloped civil societies — are considerable. Here we explore various 
reasons as to why this might be happening. We are able to look at the variations between 
eleven countries with very different routes out of communism as well as variations within 
countries according to different population groups. 
According to various papers published recently by either the World Bank or by Transparency 
International, corruption is a particular problem in transition economies. In these countries, it 
can be used to steal many assets from impoverished states and impoverished citizens, thus 
exacerbating a fiscal crisis. It can also undermine faith in the reform process on the part of 
the citizenry. It can stifle private enterprise at every level and increase the participation in the 
informal economy (Hessel & Murphy, 1999). Furthermore, the existence and the extent of 
corruption discourages foreign investment or indeed any kind of investment which can be not 
only expensive for the investor, but also uncertain, since the processes by which contracts 
are awarded are opaque. The economic crises in Russia, Ukraine and other countries are to 
a great extent exacerbated by corruption. Timothy Frye (Frye, 1998) has furthermore argued 
that there is a difference between organised corruption, whereby there is only one or a few 
organisations exacting bribes (and the corrupt authority has an incentive to keep the bribe 
low) and disorganised corruption, where many organisations are exacting payment and each 
has an incentive to raise the payment. His research shows that these differences are 
illustrated by the cases of Poland and Russia.  
Our argument in this paper is that corruption is an indication of the lack of the 
institutionalisation of capitalism and democracy in transition societies. Economic reforms 
need to be embedded in a process of political and institutional reform so that market 
behaviour is regulated. For investment to take place, contracts have to be honoured and 
business to take place in an atmosphere of trust and security. That means that they have to 
be publicly regulated and scrutinised. This depends upon the development of a civil society – 
that is, organised interest groups, a free press and public action which can help to expose or 
prevent corruption through protest – all features of democratisation. This process also 
depends upon the existence of a publicly accountable bureaucratic system. As Weber 
argued, the modern state is based upon the development of a bureaucracy which is in turn 
founded upon rational criteria and is therefore predictable (Weber, 1921). Yet with the 
collapse of the moral order associated with Communism, the rationality of the former 
bureaucracy was also undermined.  
In Western democracies this process took some centuries to be established and progress 
was not unilinear, whilst in transition countries it must take place very quickly. Where the 
political and institutional reform fails to take root, then the rapid withdrawal of the state from 
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large parts of the economy leaves a vacuum, into which corrupt and uncontrolled private 
interests can flow. This is what we term a lack of institutionalisation. Another problem is that 
there may be laws, but these laws are not implemented or enforced, what we might term 
”weak institutionalisation”. Or that the laws inhibit rather than encourage the growth of 
enterprise (through hefty taxes for example), what we might term ”distorted 
institutionalisation”. The lack of institutionalisation of capitalist enterprise means that 
enterprise which does take place is not controlled or publicly accountable. It develops 
instead in the black economy, leading to further fiscal loss for the state. This 
institutionalisation rests not only upon legislative and legal reform but upon the consensus 
and understanding of the population. 
Thus, we would assume that corruption is associated with a lack of democratisation 
(measured by democratic values), a failure of rational market principles to be established, a 
lack of freedom (to protest, to expose corruption) and a growth in the informal economy as 
well as a lack of stable economic growth. 
There is a question, however, to what extent corruption is associated with the increasing 
sclerosis of the old state system or with the new forms of enterprise and the new system. 
There is a lot of evidence to suggest that the decay of the old system was already well 
underway in the 1980s and that corruption was endemic there, but under the new conditions 
as state salaries have declined, or not been paid at all, there is more incentive for 
government officials to engage in corruption. On the other hand, there is much suspicion 
among the population (as expressed in newspapers and in qualitative interviews) that the 
most corrupt people are the new entrepreneurs; that the only way to start a business in the 
first place and hitherto to become wealthy is basically achieved through corruption.  
In this paper we explore various hypotheses, which may affect the level of corruption in 
post—communist regimes. We are mostly considering perceptions of corruption, but we later 
go on to consider what implications this has for behaviour. Our analysis is based upon a 
comparative sample survey of postcommunist citizens in the following countries: Poland, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Belarus, Slovenia, Croatia 
and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The paper is divided into four parts: first we 
construct an index of corruption and look at differences between countries concerning the 
comparative extent of perceived corruption. Second, we examine the variations between 
countries by looking at 6 hypotheses as to what might affect in a direct way corruption. Third 
we look at the variations within countries in terms of population groups and values. Finally 
we move away from perceptions of corruption and we look at corrupt behaviour, considering 
just two countries: the Czech Republic and the Ukraine. 
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Different roads to reform 
The enforced homogeneity in this region which prevailed under the former regimes has been 
replaced by increasing heterogeneity, both between countries and within countries (Agh, 
1998). In other words, the diversity of the new post—Communist Europe showed in different 
roads to reform (Wallace & Haerpfer, 1998). Thus, whilst the Central European countries of 
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia have been relatively successful in 
establishing a more market oriented and democratic society, the situation to the south in 
Croatia, FRY, Romania and Bulgaria is more unstable and the situation to the East in 
Ukraine, Belarus and Russia has been one of more or less dramatic decline. It is evident 
from Table 1 that there are three clusters amongst these countries in terms of economic 
development (as measured by GDP per capita). In this paper we are able to explore whether 
these differences in economic and democratic development have any implications for the 
level of corruption. 
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How can we measure corruption?  
This is clearly tricky as it is by its nature clandestine activity. Corruption is also culturally 
variable. What may be perfectly acceptable behaviour in conformity with general social 
norms in Uzbekistan could be seen as corruption and violating the generalised social 
consensus in the Czech Republic. We have taken as our measure of corruption a survey 
question in the New Democracies Barometer V (fielded in Spring 1998), which asked 
whether the respondent felt that the level of corruption had risen since the end of the 
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Communist regime
1
. This gets around the cultural variations in perception, but it does not of 
course tell us about behaviour.  
Perceptions of the corruption is the usual indicator used by Transparency International for 
constructing their corruption index. However, there are problems with using this as a 
measure of corruption. Public perceptions of corruption can be affected by media 
campaigns. For example, in our survey, the data in the Czech Republic was gathered at the 
time when there were almost daily exposures of scandalous swindles associated with the 
privatisation process, something in which the Czechs had previously had great confidence. 
This would have affected the public perceptions of corruption but it does not mean that there 
is more corruption in the Czech Republic, than in say, Belarus. Belarussians have a rather 
low perception of corruption because there is not a free press in Belarus, so the corruption 
there is not publicly known about. Thus, ironically, a free press could actually increase the 
perceptions of corruption and raise the corruption index precisely by doing it’s job properly.  
We address this issue later, when we analyse some additional questions which looked at 
how people would respond under a variety of situations in which corruption could be 
appropriate. These questions were about hypothetical situations, but ones which were very 
common and would likely have been faced by most families – if a child’s exam marks are not 
high enough to be admitted to University, if a person needs a government permit, if a person 
has a painful disease and wants to be admitted quickly to hospital and if the family would like 
to get access to a government subsidised flat. Moreover, because they were hypothetically 
posed (what would you do if...) the respondent is not endangered by their answer and would 
have less incentive to conceal the truth.
2
  
In this latter set of questions about corruption behaviour, we have distinguished between 
monetised corruption – offering bribes – and non—monetised corruption – using 
connections. The latter was probably more common than the former under the former 
regimes as ”network capital” in the words of Endre Sik was used as a way of securing 
resources and became even more important under the postcommunist conditions when 
there were more resources to secure (Sik, 1994). 
The results are based upon a representative sample survey of the mass public carried out in 
spring 1998 in 11 post—Communist countries, which was directed by Christian W. Haerpfer, 
Richard Rose and Claire Wallace. There are at least 1000 respondents in each country and 
12 643 respondents altogether.  
                                                 
1 The question was the following: ”By comparison with the former Communist regime, would you say that the level of 
corruption and taking bribes has: increased, remained much the same or decreased ?” 
2 These questions were developed by Richard Rose.  
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In the following tables we have used the perceived level of corruption in form of a 
”Corruption—Scale” as the dependent variable, the explanandum, and the other variables as 
independent, the explanans. We have used Eta as a measure of bivariate association, 
because it measures the association between a dependent variable which is metric and 
independent variables which can be of any level of measurement. The maximal value for Eta 
is 1.00 so the higher the Eta value, the stronger the association between the variables.  
Where possible we have constructed indexes for different dimensions by combining the 
results of a number of separate questions. 
Part 1: An index of corruption 
Following the methodology used by Transparency International, we created an index of 
corruption based upon the question about perceptions of corruption
3
 within the general 
public. The results are set out in Figure 2. Here it can be seen that most people fall at the 
higher end of the five—point scale. In other words, most people feel that corruption has 
increased a lot. The mean score is 4.2 and the standard deviation .98 which means that 
there was not a lot of variation amongst the population. Most people agreed that corruption 
had increased a lot since the collapse of Communism. 
 
Figure 2: Index of corruption 
Statistics
CORRINDX  Index of corruption
11178
118
4,1859
,9883
Valid
Missing
N
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3 The exact question wording was ”By comparison with the former Communist regime, would you say that the level 
of corruption and taking bribes has: increased a lot, increased a little, has remained much the same, has decreased 
a little, has decreased a lot. ” 
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CORRINDX  Index of corruption
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The next table shows the ranking of different countries along the corruption index: 
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Table 1 Corruption Index by country 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
1. Poland 3.7 1.02 
2. Slovenia 3.7 1.19 
3. Croatia 4.0 0.99 
4. Bulgaria 4.1 0.92 
5. Czech Republic 4.1 0.94 
NDB mean 4.2 0.98 
6. Belarus 4.2 0.99 
7. Hungary 4.3 0.89 
8. Slovakia 4.3 0.92 
9. FRY 4.4 0.88 
10. Romania 4.5 0.85 
11. Ukraine 4.6 0.75 
 
In this table we can see that among our countries there was Poland at one extreme, with the 
lowest perception of corruption and Ukraine at the other with the highest perception of 
corruption.  However, whilst in Ukraine there was very strong agreement amongst all 
sections of the population on this matter, in Poland there was more variation in opinion. The 
people of Slovenia also had a very low estimation of corruption, but with the most variation 
within the population. Croatia is also a low corruption country according to our index with a 
mean of 0.3 above the NDB mean). Among the middle group (means within 0.3 of the overall 
NDB mean) we find Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Belarus, Hungary and Slovakia. Among the 
high corruption countries (means 0.3 points above the NDB mean) we find the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro but excluding Kosovo), Romania and 
Ukraine. 
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Part 2 Variations between countries 
In this part of the paper we look in a more systematic way at what affects the variations in 
levels of corruption between countries. In particular we look at the role of economic growth, 
democratisation, levels of freedom, the informal economy, the extent of successful 
implementation of institutions and attitudes to market reform (marketisation).  
Hypothesis 1: That corruption declines with economic development 
One measure of the success in the institutionalisation of capitalism is economic 
development. Here we take economic growth in the period between 1993 and 1998 as 
indicator of economic development. Our indicator of economic growth is the cumulation of 
annual changes of the GDP from 1993 until 1998 on the basis of the annually published 
EBRD—Transition Reports. Our hypothesis is that corruption will decline as economic 
growth is improving. 
Figure 3: The relationship between Economic Growth and Corruption 
Correlation Coefficient Pearsons r = — 0.69 
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We did find a high correlation of –0.69 between economic growth on the one hand and the 
level of corruption on the other. That correlation is the second strongest behind the impact of 
marketisation upon corruption in the whole study. Poland is the country with the highest 
cumulative growth of 33,8 per cent between 1993 and 1998 (See appendix, Table 1) and 
Poland is at the same time the country with the lowest level of corruption perception. 
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Slovenia has the third highest level of economic growth and also a very low level of 
corruption. Croatia is also fulfilling that clear and distinct pattern of a negative correlation 
between economic growth and level of corruption. Slovakia has the second best level of 
economic growth between 1993 and 1998, but shows a relatively high level of corruption, 
which might be explained by the fact, that the Slovakian survey was conducted in May 1998, 
when the government of Prime Minister Meciar was still in office. The impact of the change of 
government in Slovakia after the General Elections in September 1998 upon the 
interrelationship between growth and corruption will be visible, when we will conduct our next 
comparative survey, the New Europe Barometer, in 2000 in Slovakia and 10 other post—
Communist countries. 
The Ukraine shows with a value of –64,3 per cent the most dramatic reduction of GDP 
between 1993 and 1998 and she is also the country with the highest level of corruption. The 
Ukraine shows extremely clearly the importance of stable economic growth for the fight 
against corruption. The link between negative economic growth and high levels of corruption 
is also visible in Bulgaria and Belarus.  
Hypothesis 2: That corruption declines with democratisation 
This hypothesis is based upon the idea that democratisation will make institutions more 
transparent and more accountable, which should lead to a decline in corruption. 
Democratisation is important for bringing about the kind of enforceable regulation of 
economic activity for which there is a consensual agreement. It is also important for creating 
a civil society, which would ensure the enforcement of those regulations. Thus it would seem 
that democratisation is essential for the development of a market economy which is open 
and fair and not controlled by Mafia or other clandestine interests, an ‘Open Society’ in the 
sense of Karl Popper.  
An alternative scenario however, and one that many of our respondents subscribe to, so that 
communism imposed a certain conformity of behaviour upon people and a certain moral 
order, but with this having collapsed, it is replaced by an ”anything goes” society where 
individual interests take precedence over collective ones and over the social good. In other 
words, freedom is associated with a general moral as well as economic decline.  
Here we looked at the association of our 10 point index for democratisation against the five 
point scale for corruption.
4
 The index for democratisation is based upon a series of 9 
questions, which measured attitudes to democratic transformation in spring 1998.  
                                                 
4 The index of democratisation consists of the following groups: 
1. Persons, who evaluate the Communist political system negatively 
2. Persons, who evaluate the current democratic political system positively 
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We can see from figure 4 that there is a strong negative association between 
democratisation and corruption with a correlation coefficient of — 0.66. Poland and Ukraine 
are at the most extreme points. In Ukraine there was the lowest level of democratisation and 
the highest level of corruption, whilst in Poland there is the highest level of democratisation 
and the lowest level of corruption. Slovenia is close to Poland on both axes, whilst the rest of 
the countries are clustered around the middle. FRY and Belarus are also situated with lower 
levels of democratisation, which appears not much of a surprise, if one is analysing the 
democratic performance of those states and rather high levels of corruption. Croatia and the 
Czech Republic have relatively high ratings concerning the democratic transformation, but 
also comparative low levels of corruption. Hungary, Slovakia and Romania have high levels 
of corruption as well as higher levels of democratisation and this is particularly the case in 
Romania. The outcome of this analysis implies that in general, corruption declines with 
higher levels of democratisation. Democracy is an effective weapon in the fight against 
corruption in societies in transition. 
Figure 4: The relationship between Democratisation and Corruption 
Correlation Coefficient Pearson’s r = — 0,66 
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3. Persons, who are optimistic about the future of democracy in their country 
4. Persons, who are against a Military Regime 
5. Persons, who are against a return to the old Communist Regime 
6. Persons, who are against a strong authoritarian leader 
7. Persons, who are against Monarchy 
8. Persons, who think that the supsension of the democratic Parliament is unlikely 
9. Persons, who are defending the democratic Parliament 
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Hypothesis 3: That corruption declines with increasing marketisation 
The acceptance of capitalist market values by the population are an important element in the 
institutionalisation of capitalism in post—Communist countries. Here we constructed an 
index which put together the values in nine questions measuring attitudes to market reform
5
. 
Figure 5 shows the relationship between corruption and marketisation.  
In Figure 5 we can see an extremely strong negative association between marketisation and 
corruption with a correlation coefficient of — 0.70. That is the strongest bivariate coefficient 
of association throughout our whole study. Once again, Poland and Ukraine lie at the two 
extremes, with Ukraine having the highest corruption combined with the lowest level 
marketisation and Poland having the highest marketisation and lowest perception of 
corruption respectively. Most of the other countries fall somewhere along this backward 
sloping axis. The outliers in this chart are Slovenia with low corruption and middle 
marketisation and Romania, which has high corruption and high marketisation. In the Czech 
Republic, we notice a high level of marketisation, but at the same time a medium level of 
corruption as consequence of the cases of economic corruption under the government of 
Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus (Wallace, 1998). 
In general we could say that the higher the degree of marketisation as expressed by a 
general and widespread acceptance of market values, the lower the level of corruption. The 
extent of marketisation is the most crucial factor in fighting corruption in post—Communist 
economies. 
 
                                                 
5 The index of marketisation consists of the following groups: 
1. Persons, who evaluate the Communist economy negatively 
2. Persons, who evaluate the current market economy positively 
3. Persons, who are optimistic about the future of the market economy in their country 
4. Persons, who link income with personal achievement 
5. Persons, who hold the individual responsible for welfare 
6. Persons, who prefer private enterprise and ownership 
7. Persons, who prefer market mechanisms for prices 
8. Persons, who support the Western model of market economy  
9. Persons, who trust private enterprises 
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Figure 5: The relationship between Marketisation and Corruption 
Correlation Coefficient Pearson’s r = — 0,70 
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Hypothesis 4: that corruption declines with increasing 
institutionalisation 
With this hypothesis, we test the proposition that institutional reforms will bring about a 
decline in corruption. Hence, it is claimed that corruption will undermine trust in public 
institutions, lead to cynicism and delay or divert a transition to democracy. By institutional 
reform we mean the creation of democratic institutions such as the courts, the government, 
the Parliament, the political parties etc. We measure institutionalisation by recording the level 
of trust in nine different institutions. Thus, a high degree of trust in the various institutions 
would lead to a higher level of institutionalisation
6
 
                                                 
6 The Index of Institutionalisation consists of the following sub—groups: 
1. Persons with trust in political parties 
2. Persons with trust in courts 
3. Persons with trust in the police 
4. Persons with trust in civil servants 
5. Persons with trust in current government 
6. Persons with trust in the military 
7. Persons with trust in current parliament 
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In Figure 6 we show the relationship between institutionalisation and corruption in the 
different countries. There is quite a strong negative association between the two indices with 
a correlation coefficient of — 0.33. Again, Poland is at one extreme, with low levels of 
corruption and high levels of institutionalisation, whilst Ukraine is at the other with extremely 
low levels of trust in institutions and high levels of corruption. The general trust in institutions 
and the extent of successful institutionalisation is very low in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, even well before the conflict in Kosovo. Most of the other countries are slightly 
above this axis since in general there were rather high levels of institutionalisation. Romania 
is once more an outlier with the highest levels of institutionalisation and the high levels of 
corruption. Slovenia and Poland had lower levels of institutionalisation than other countries 
but also lower levels of corruption. Interesting is the case of Slovakia, where we could find 
towards the end of the era of Prime Minister Meciar a rather high level of corruption 
perception within the Slovak society as well as only a medium trust in Sovak political and 
public institutions. 
Therefore in general we could say that the higher the level of institutionalisation (as 
measured by trust in a variety of institutions), the lower the levels of corruption, but for us a 
rather surprising result is that this was not as strong as in the case of support for 
marketisation and democracy, or regarding the impact of economic growth upon subjective 
perceptions of corruption. Therefore, whilst corruption does undermine faith in public 
institutions, there is not a uniform strong pattern. It is possible to have a lot of trust in 
institutions and still to believe in an increase in corruption.  
                                                                                                                                          
8. Persons with trust in current President 
9. Persons with trust in current Prime Minister 
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Figure 6: The relationship between Institutionalisation and Corruption 
Correlation Coefficient Pearson’s r = — 0,33 
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Hypothesis 5: that corruption declines with increasing freedom 
In this hypothesis we consider whether as assessment of the amount of freedom in the 
country after the end of Communism is influencing the subjective perception of Corruption at 
the level of the mass public. The Freedom Index, which we developed especially for this 
study, consists of the following nine classical freedoms, well known from the discourse about 
human rights and civil rights in political theory: 
 
1. Freedom of opinion 
2. Freedom of association 
3. Freedom of travelling and movement 
4. Freedom of influencing government 
5. Freedom against unlawful arrest (”Habeas Corpus”) 
6. Freedom of interest in politics 
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7. Equal and fair treatment by government 
8. Freedom of religion7 
The idea would be that the more free people feel, the more they feel that corruption is low 
because they would feel free to do something about corruption. In fact we found almost no 
association between freedom and corruption, with a correlation coefficient of only —0.04. 
 
Figure 7: The relationship between personal Freedoms and Corruption 
Correlation Coefficient Pearson’s r = — 0,04 
I
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In comparison with the other indices of economic and political transformation and of the 
process of building new institutions, we found out that the subjective perception of more 
personal freedom is not associated with low levels of corruption. There is practically no 
correlation between the perception of corruption on the one hand and the perception of an 
improvement of personal freedoms in comparison between the Communist and the 
Democratic regime on the other hand. The greatest difference between personal freedoms 
under Communism and under post—Communism was found in Romania, where the regime 
of Ceaucescou was successful in destroying all forms of individual freedom. Hence, 
                                                 
7 The wording of the question was as follows: ”Please think of the difference between the old system of government 
under the Communists and our present democratic system. I will read out a series of statements (Freedoms) on this 
card. Please tell me for each point whether you think our present political system, by comparison with the 
Communists, is much better, somewhat better, equal, somewhat worse or much worse.” 
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Romania shows a high level of personal freedoms after the demise of Communism and at 
the same time a high level of corruption. Poland displays an expected regular pattern of 
medium levels of personal freedoms and low levels of corruption. The subjective perception 
of freedom under post—Communism is particularly low in the Ukraine, the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, Belarus and in Croatia. Poland can again be regarded as the model country of 
transformation: Polish society shows a high level of improved personal freedoms under 
post—Communism and a very low level of corruption. In Slovakia, for obvious reasons, the 
perception of improved political freedom during the government of Prime Minister Meciar 
was not very good, it will be interesting to analyse the impact of the recent change in 
government in Slovakia upon the Freedom Index in Slovakia. 
Hypothesis 6: that corruption declines with the increasing formalisation 
of economic activities. 
Here we test the proposition found in many papers that corruption is associated with an 
increase in informal economic activity and the black economy. In the index of formalisation 
we have not measured so much the informal economy, as the extent to which household 
members are more or less entirely participating in the formal economy. In other words it is an 
index of the formalisation of economic activities
8
, putting together five different survey 
questions relating to the formal economy. The formal economy here means the extent to 
which people rely upon their earnings from a regular job or a pension for their livelihood. Our 
argument is that if economic activities take place more within the formal economy, there will 
be less corruption. 
Figure 8 shows the relationship between formalisation and corruption. Here we can see once 
more a negative association between formalisation and corruption with a correlation 
coefficient of —0.31. However, the pattern is more uneven than for the other indicators which 
has pushed down the intensity of bivariate association. At one extreme we have Ukraine, 
Romania and FRY with very low levels of formalisation of the economy and high levels of 
corruption. At the other extreme we have Slovenia and Poland with middling levels of 
formalisation and low levels of corruption. However, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia are all above the axis – they have high formalisation combined with relatively high 
corruption. Interesting in that context is the high level of formalisation of economic activities 
at the household level in the Slovak economy. 
                                                 
8 The Index of Formalisation consists of the following sub—groups: 
1. Persons with job or transfer within formal economy  
2. Persons earning enough money from formal job for standard of living 
3. Persons and households with no informal job 
4. Persons, for whom the formal economy is most important for standard of living 
5. Persons, who got by financially the last year 
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We could say therefore, that whilst in general there is a tendency for corruption to decline 
with formalisation, this is with the exception of Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, 
countries where despite the generally successful nature of the transition, there have been 
many scandals associated with privatisation, which may have raised levels of the perception 
of corruption.  
 
Figure 8: The relationship between Formalisation of Economy and Corruption 
Correlation Coefficient Pearson’s r = — 0,31 
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Part 3: Variations within countries 
In the following analysis, we looked at factors within in the populations of each country which 
lead to them perceiving an increase or a decline in corruption. The results are presented as 
a series of Eta values of bivariate correlation in Table 2. 
Here we can look at the variations in economic development by different social groups within 
the country and see what effect this has on perceived levels of corruption. In this respect we 
need to distinguish between objective measures of poverty, of which household income and 
ownership of consumer goods are the best measures, and subjective measures such as how 
poor the person feels themselves to be.  
First, if we look at household income, we find a slight tendency for those who think corruption 
has increased to be in the lower income range (see Table 10), although car ownership was a 
slightly better measure of this.  
However, subjective measures of poverty were better indicators for the perceived levels of 
corruption. In particular, if the person felt that their situation had declined relative to the past, 
this was very strongly associated with the idea that levels of corruption had risen. In other 
words, the sense of individual decline was reflected in their sense of societal decline. Other 
poverty/wealth indicators which pointed in the same direction, included being able to earn 
enough money from one’s main job to buy the things one really needs and a scale of 
deprivation which included if the respondent had had to do without food, heating and clothing 
in the last year to make ends meet. All of these were strongly associated with perceived 
levels of corruption – the more deprived a person felt, the more they felt that corruption had 
risen.  
This pessimism also emerged in their assessment of the system as a whole. Those who 
thought corruption had risen felt that the socialist economic system in the past was a better 
one, and rated the present and future economic systems negatively.  
Finally, we considered whether the sector in which one was employed made any difference 
to perceived levels of corruption. We found no significant impact of different sectors of 
employment upon the perceived level of corruption.  
We considered what influence a range of demographic variables had upon the perceived 
levels of corruption, but neither education nor gender nor town size were of any significance. 
However, age did affect perceptions of corruption – older people were likely to perceive more 
corruption.  
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Table 2: Social groups and Corruption 
( Eta Values for bivariate relationship ) 
 
Variable Eta 
Economic variations  
Car ownership .075 
Household income .059 
On a welfare benefit .007 
Earning enough money from main job .176 
Deprivation scale .150 
Economic situation compared with past .238 
Socialist economy rating .211 
Current economy rating .269 
Future economy rating .194 
Government agency .028 
State enterprise .008 
*Privatised company .003 
New private enterprise .026 
Private farm .004 
Collective farm .016 
Political Values  
Communist political system rating .220 
Current political system rating .243 
Future political system rating .176 
Demographic characteristics  
Gender .003 
Age .084 
Town size .013 
Education .026 
Corrupt behaviour  
If exam marks bad .108 
If there are bureaucratic delays .172 
Move up hospital waiting list .125 
Action to get a non—entitled flat .177 
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Part 4 Corrupt Behaviour 
In two of the countries under consideration, a series of questions asked how a person would 
respond if faced with a range of everyday situations: if their child’s exam marks were not 
good enough to be admitted to University, if a person needs a government permit to do 
something, if they have a painful disease and want to be admitted quickly to hospital and if 
they want to get a government subsidised flat to which they are not entitled. In each case, 
the respondent was given the choice between offering a bribe (monetised corruption), using 
connections (non—monetised connections), writing a letter (formal methods), paying 
privately (private market solution) or resigning (nothing can be done). The Czech Republic 
and Ukraine were chosen as offering possible extremes in corrupt activity, the former having 
a relatively successful, institutionalised democracy and market economy and the latter 
having none of these things.  
People in the Ukraine were far more likely to offer a bribe than people in the Czech Republic. 
In most cases, the people in Ukraine are also more likely to use informal connections than 
are people in the Czech Republic. The people in the Czech Republic, on the other hand, are 
almost always more likely to write a letter, using formal methods of protest, than are the 
people of Ukraine. The differences are very striking. The number ”resigning” are fairly similar 
in both countries.  
But what is the association between perceptions of levels of corruption and corrupt 
behaviour? The associations here were all rather strong ones. We can assume therefore, 
that there is a high correlation between perceived level of corruption and actual behaviour.  
Next we considered in which employment sectors the person worked against their corruption 
behaviour. In each case it was those who worked in the state sector rather than the private 
sector who were likely to use both monetised and non—monetised forms of corruption. This 
would imply that it is the state sector which is a source of corruption more than the new 
private sector.  
If we now consider age group, once more, an interesting factor emerges. Whilst older people 
are more likely to feel that corruption has increased, younger people are far more likely to 
used corruption or connections in almost every instance. Older people are much more 
fatalistic – they are more likely to fee that ”nothing can be done” and are also more likely to 
resort to letter writing than other age groups. We might say, therefore, that young people 
have absorbed more a culture of corruption. 
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Conclusions 
1. Corruption increased strongly in all post—communist countries in comparison with 
corruption under Communism 
2. The strongest influence upon corruption perception is the extent of marketisation. 
Identification with the basic principles of market economy in a given economy correlates 
with a decline in corruption.  
3. The second strongest factor of subjective evaluation of corruption consists in economic 
growth. The higher the economic growth in the period 1993—1998, the lower the 
perceived level of corruption.  
4. The third strongest influence upon perception of corruption was identified by the extent of 
democratisation. Identification with the basic principles of democracy and support for 
the current democracy correlates highly with a decline in corruption. 
5. The fourth strongest factor of perceived corruption relates to the extent of 
institutionalisation, the creation of new institutions during the transition process. High 
levels of trust in political, public and civil society institutions correlates with a decline in 
corruption. Successful institutionalisation appears to reduce the scope for corruption.  
6. High levels of political and civil freedoms in post—Communist societies are not 
correlated with a decline of corruption. The new freedom of the post—Communist citizens 
in an ”Open Society” is not inevitably moving against corruption. 
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